The Battle of Charleroi, one of the Battles of the Frontiers, was one of the key battles on the Western Front in 1914 and one of the early major German victories.
The battle comprised a major action fought between the French Fifth Army, advancing north to the River Sambre, and the German Second and Third Armies, moving southwest through Belgium.
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Charleroi itself was a mid-size industrial town crossing the River Sambre and was a battlefront stretching approximately 25 miles west of Namur, where the river joins with the Meuse.
Background
France's pre-war strategy document, Plan XVII, determined that the French Fifth Army should join the Third and Fourth Armies in an invasion of Germany through the Ardennes.
This, however, assumed that Germany would not attempt an invasion of France further north, i.e., through Belgium.
Charles Lanrezac, Fifth Army commander, believed this a distinct possibility, particularly as he observed a massive build-up of German forces in Belgium; Joffre, the French Commander-in-Chief, refused to consider the possibility.
Joffre did, however, allow Lanrezac to extend his lines northwest to the Sambre on August 12, but at the same time, Lanrezac lost some of his Fifth Army troops and transferred to the Ardennes offensive; they were replaced by a corps from the Second Army in Lorraine.
Following repeated warnings by Lanrezac, Joffre agreed that he could concentrate his forces further north on August 20. By this time, however, units of Karl von Bulow's German Second Army were nearing Namur. It was not a good time for the Allies: that same day, the Germans marched into Brussels.
The Fighting
In authorizing an attack across the river, Joseph Joffre expected the German forces to comprise no more than 18 divisions, against which would be ranged Lanrezac's 15 divisions with reinforcements arriving from the BEF adding another three divisions Lanrezac, however, believed the German strength to be much higher, nearer in fact to the real figure of 38 divisions.
Consequently, he asked for a postponement of the attack on August 21, preferring to wait for the arrival of the British.
However, detachments from the German Second Army attacked across the Sambre that same morning, establishing and then successfully defending two bridgeheads against repeated French counter-attacks. Thousands of Belgians fled from Charleroi and nearby villages.
Von Bulow renewed his attacks the following day, pitching three corps across the entire French front. Fighting was heavy but confusing, continuing throughout the day and well into the next.
The center of the French lines, at Charleroi, suffered heavy losses and retreated, whereas the French corps west of Charleroi held its position, as did General Franchet d'Esperey's corps in the far east.
Unfortunately, the retreat of General Sordet's cavalry in the far west exposed the right wing of the late-arriving British Expeditionary Force at Mons.
Von Bulow's forces managed to cross the Meuse, but he chose not to position them across the French Fifth Army's rear in the south, instead ordering a full frontal attack against the French right. General d'Esperey's corps took a position in trenches and cleared the Fifth Army's lines of retreat on August 23.
Lanrezac, having difficulty communicating with d'Esperey, expected the lines of retreat to be closed at any moment. He was aware that the German Third Army had established a bridgehead across the Meuse to his south, but he did not know that General Mangin's brigade had successfully held them back and was on the verge of a successful counter-attack.
Once news of the Belgian pull-out from Namur reached him, along with the retreat of the French Fourth Army from the Ardennes, Lanrezac ordered a general withdrawal of his forces.
Lanrezac's decision to withdraw probably saved the French Army from destruction. By retreating, the French were able to hold northern France, but the French public at large - and Joffre - saw Lanrezac's action as simply lacking 'offensive spirit'.
Given that Joffre had permitted the withdrawal of his subsequent condemnation of Lanrezac - he blamed him for the failure of Plan XVII - looks opportunistic.