Date: September 16, 1777.
Region: Middle Colonies, Pennsylvania.
Opposing Forces: British: 18,000 (including 5,000 Hessians); American: 10,000...
British Perspective: After defeating Gen. George Washington’s army at the Battle of Brandywine (September 11, 1777), General William Howe’s British army spent the next several days treating the wounded and burying the dead.
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Although the rebels had initially retreated toward Chester, once out of immediate danger, Washington had circled around in a great arc and was again maneuvering his army into position between the British lines and Philadelphia.
Howe, meanwhile, focused his immediate concerns on securing a safe port at Wilmington on the Delaware River. By the 14th of September, the British Navy was unloading supplies and taking on wounded British soldiers for evacuation. On the 15th, Howe resumed his march toward Philadelphia.
To his surprise, intelligence gleaned from scouts and local spies indicated the rebel army was holding positions along with the upper fords of the Schuylkill River just ten miles to the north. Generals Howe, Cornwallis, and Knyphausen made plans to attack Washington.
The British army crept forward in two separate columns in the pre-dawn darkness of September 16. Cornwallis led one wing with 13,000 men toward the enemy deployed around White Horse Tavern; Knyphausen led the second smaller wing of about 5,000 men in two sections, one along the Wilmington Pike toward Boot Tavern and the other along the Pottstown Pike to Indian King Tavern.
American Perspective: After his humiliating defeat along the Brandywine, George Washington withdrew his exhausted army toward Chester, Pennsylvania.
Early the next morning, he ordered his soldiers to fall out at 4:00 a.m. The grueling march that followed consumed 17 hours in an effort to place the army in a blocking position between the British army at Brandywine Creek and the colonial capital in Philadelphia.
The Continental Army reached the falls of the Schuylkill River without incident and was once more in a position to defend Philadelphia against Howe’s British. Washington allowed his men to spend September 13 recuperating and preparing for battle.
On September 14, Washington marched his army another 14 miles west and took up several key locations along likely enemy approach routes. The leading element of his army deployed at White Horse Tavern, with the rest of the army taking up positions along a three-mile stretch of ground running east and terminating at Warren Tavern.
Washington established his headquarters near the center of the line at Malin Hall. From this position, the Americans could defend the important supply centers at Reading, Valley Forge, Warwick, and Coventry and still cover Philadelphia. As far as Washington could discern, Howe’s army was still camped around Chadd’s Ford 10 miles to the south.
Washington’s brilliant and aggressive maneuver had effectively nullified the British victory at Brandywine. His Continentals were once again arrayed in a viable defensive line with their foe in front and the capital in their rear. On the morning of September 16, Washington received intelligence that the British were advancing.
In an effort to better meet his enemy, Washington altered his alignment by extending his three-mile-long line southward a short distance. This allowed him to occupy key terrain along the crest of the South Valley Hills parallel with the Indian King Road from Three Tuns Tavern in the east to Boot Tavern in the west.
The Battle
At about 1:00 p.m., Washington ordered cavalry led by Count Casimir Pulaski, supported by 300 light infantry, to move forward, find the advancing enemy, and delay the advance. Cornwallis countered this move by dispatching his own light infantry ahead of his column. The American infantry refused to stand and skirmish and was easily brushed aside.
More American infantry led by Brig. Gens. “Mad” Anthony Wayne and William Maxwell clashed with General Knyphausen’s advancing Hessian Jägers near Boot Tavern. The American line of battle ran through cornfields along the high ground overlooking the road below, and from this point, they poured heavy fire into a large advance party of infantry under Count von Donop’s command.
When Hessian grenadiers reinforced the Jägers, the Americans withdrew rather precipitately into the forest. The brief fight against Knyphausen’s troops had held the Americans in position while a British column under General Edward Matthew to the west moved unopposed and swung into position on the American right flank.
The British columns advanced in a brilliant triple pincer maneuver that rapidly carried them onto the high ground west of White Horse Tavern. Washington’s extended lines were no longer tenable.
Just when it looked as if another major disaster similar to the fight at Brandywine Creek was about to erupt, a heavy rainfall cut the day’s events short. Many participants left vivid descriptions of the torrent of rain that fell so fast and furious that, within minutes, the already saturated terrain was a lake of mud so thick it rendered movement nearly impossible.
The rain and high winds ruined gunpowder and paper cartridges. Although the British contemplated making a bayonet assault, the sticky ground quickly made the option impossible. Washington wisely took the opportunity to evacuate the field in a strategic retrograde to the northwest while maintaining a defense of the fords across the Schuylkill River.
The rain and wind gave the surreal scene its nickname: “The Battle of the Clouds.” Washington reformed his army along the high ground near Yellow Springs (now Chester Springs), and the day’s fight ended as it had begun: in a standoff.